Strong ethical guidelines
There is a pretty standard argument that goes something like this: ‘moral relativity’ is untrue, because it does not allow us to make strong moral evaluations and act against evil, or evil people. Therefore, we need a clear set of moral guidelines to guide us, and for us to be able to act decisively.
Now this may be correct but it is also extremely problematic.
Which Guidelines?
Firstly which set of moral guidelines do we choose?
Do we choose Christian ones, Buddhist ones, Islamic ones, Confucian ones, or the traditional mode of tribal societies, which we might call negotiated custom?
If, for example, we choose Christian ones, then which Christian ones? There is a considerable range of ethical systems within Christianity, and a fair amount of dispute over them. Its not immediately clear which set of Christian morals we would choose as they are all based on roughly the same set of texts and principles.
Even Sharia law has areas of dispute, and in practice people argue over how it should be applied.
Even the same sets of instructions do not always result in moral agreement. There does not seem to be an ethical ‘mechanism’ which can be rolled out and used infallibly in all cases, or which is immediately obvious, if you do not already accept it.
How do we choose?
Secondly how do we choose our preferred system?
I often suspect that people who make this allegation about the virtue of strong moral systems, have already chosen, or already know what they think people should choose, but let’s postpone that allegation for a while, and ask a question….
“Is it possible to make an ethical decision which is not already based on ethical principles?” How do I judge one set of ethical principles as being better than another, without already having made an ethical choice in favour of some ethical principles?
To rephrase a little, the question of “Should people base their life on this set of ethical principles?” may only be decidable by ethical principles.
For example. “Should we accept text A as the word of God, and should we obey it without question” is a set of ethical questions. We evaluate text A at least partially, by our feeling whether or not it is ethical enough for God to have “dictated it.” If we think not, then it is hard to accept it as a complete guide to ethics.
The assertion about obeying that text, then implies the question of whether it is ethical to obey whatever God is said to have said. People might think that particular ethical question is easy, but it is still an ethical question. Someone could assert that it is not ethical to obey God, because God gave use free will and allowed us to think for ourselves. Or we could assert it is not ethical to obey God because every situation is fresh and the text simply provides examples for that moment, or the moment when it was written or dictated. Or we could assert that some of what God is reported as having said, is contradictory, or immoral judged by other parts of what God is alleged to have said and taught, and we have to evaluate which statement has precidence and when.
Then thee is the old question of whether God give us ethical principles which are ethical only because God says so, or because they are really ethical, based on something else? If morals are only morals because God said so, then is God immoral and tyrannous? Different people give different arguments on these subjects.
Even a text which asserts ethics should be about human survival, makes the ethical assumption that human survival is good. Others may be more skeptical about that ethical assertion. We could at least ask, “at what cost can we privilege human survival?”
Are strong guidelines ethically beneficial, or do they just give us excuses for immorality?
Thirdly, is there any evidence that people with strong ethical guidelines are more ethical, on the whole, than those without? The Inquisition comes to mind. Islamic slavery comes to mind. Religious wars come to mind. The Nazis and Stalinists come to mind. These systems were pretty morally absolutist, yet to people outside them, they could easily look immoral, and need to be resisted.
We may need to ask, whether a demand for strong ethics is often merely a demand for the ability to harm people we don’t like, or think are inferior, with a clear conscience? The demand allows us to oppose those we have defined as evil, without examining whether our own views of righteousness also cause evil, or other harms? If so, then could a demand for strong ethics be immoral?
It is an interesting question because often these arguments in favour of strong morals, come from those who seem committed to acts others might define as evil. For example I’ve recently heard Trumpists declare “One must never tolerate evil” – that is apparently apart from Donald Trump, who is to be supported (not just ‘tolerated’) whatever. There is apparently, to be no question that he is moral as is the movement which supports him, and he is not to be questioned. This does suggest that the strong guidelines are demanded to excuse people from moral reflection, or from facing normal ethical difficulties, and to help them assume that they are correct and righteous without effort, or without much attention to their guidelines or the accuracy of their judgements. Other people might assert that this refusal to consider moral difficulty is, itself, immoral.
It could well be that if a person believed that failure to keep the strong moral code meant eternal damnation, that they would do everything they could to condemn others for their own failures, so as to try and persuade God not to harm them. And if God does harm people forever, is God moral, or are we just providing an excuse that He must be, in fear of what will happen to us if we consider the possibility that God is not moral?
Human psychology seems forever ingenious in its ability to engage in self-justification and self-protection. I could be doing the same, but at least I am aware of the possibility.
Are any parts of Moral Relativism useful?
As implied above it seems impossible to take a moral position without moral assumptions. In which case what others call ‘moral relativism,’ and immoral, may also derive from morality.
A real moral relativist may well not consider it moral to condemn others all the time. They might engage in self-defence, or decide someone could need locking away to protect people, but they may not assert that they were particularly righteous in doing so.
They might accept there is a God, but ethically leave absolute moral judgements to God, who is apparently capable of it and not insist on the righteousness of their own condemnation or dislikes.
They may well accept that an ethical basis of ethics is to admit that ethics is difficult, and possibly not certain in every single case.
They might accept that an ethical case nearly always involves some dispute between the parties involved, and that it was ethical to listen to the other sides, and to learn from the case if possible, before you came to an ethical conclusion.
They might recognise that it was easy for humans to deceive themselves about their morality, and judge actions of members of our own group as good, when those actions would be condemned if performed by members of another group, especially a disliked group.
They might accept that what was ethical action in one situation would not always be ethical in another apparently similar situation, as situations are rarely (if ever) identical.
They might doubt it is ethical to claim to be a moral authority, and hence be suspicious of people who did proclaim themselves to be moral authorities.
They might decide that as human knowledge was limited, the ethical approach to any ethical decision was to regard the decision as provisional and open to change.
They might accept that many acts appear both good and bad, depending on what aspects you focused on.
They might decide it is immoral to force their morality on others. They might also admit the possibility they could be wrong, which again reinforces the idea it is immortal to force their morality on others.
This does not mean that they would always have to choose to “resist not evil” (Matt 5.39), but that they understand it is probable the ‘evil person’, or immoral organisation, thinks they are doing good, as do their followers. They realise this fact could apply to themselves as well, but never-the-less they may act, after consideration, as best they can.
They are likely to accept that in this world we can only achieve imperfect good, and that virtuous acts, and organisations founded to pursue virtue, can generate unintended consequences which may not be judged as good. So we ethically need to pay attention to the consequences of our actions, rather than assume that because we think we are good, or doing good, we can do no harm.
I leave it to readers to think about other ethical goods of ‘moral relativism.’
If you cannot bring yourself to do this, then maybe you are being immoral? But of course you can dispute that ethical position.
Positive thinking and ethics
If you remember, the original position being looked at, apparently suggests moral relativism is harmful and is therefore untrue.
There is no reason a truth cannot be harmful, unpleasant or demoralising. To assert otherwise, is just optimism or positive thinking speaking, and there is nothing necessarily true about that. If someone makes this argument, it could appear they are either refusing to look at the subject, running away from the Truth, or simply trying to hold onto some kind of power.
Some of ex-president Trump’s reasoning seems to follow this pattern.
- Covid-19 is unpleasant and harmful to the economy therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance. The evidence people are dying in large numbers must be false.
- Climate change is unpleasant therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance. The evidence indicating it is getting worse must be false, and I will get by whatever.
- Racism is unpleasant therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance. The evidence that black people in the US get shot and injured by police disproportionately to their numbers in the population must be false. People on my side, cannot be racist, they are just misunderstood.
- Being taken advantage of by North Korea is unpleasant therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance.
- Failure to build or extend a wall very far, or get the Mexicans to pay for it, is unpleasant therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance. The wall is a great success.
- Losing is unpleasant therefore it cannot be happening or its only of minor importance. As loosing is unpleasant, there must be lots of evidence that loosing did not happen, even if I cannot seem to present it in court. People who say I’ve lost are biased, or weak, enemies. Virtue says I have to have won.
Trump’s followers often seem to think, that if Trump (and Republicanism) is not on their side it would be unpleasant and there would be no hope of life getting better, therefore he must be on their side and working for them, and all the evidence he is not is pure fakery.
Sadly the unpleasant is often more accurate, and needs to be faced rather than avoided or concealed.
Harmful positive thinking denies reality.
Beneficial positive thinking can accept the unpleasantness, or “non-optimality” of the situation, but asserts we do not have to be victims, we might still have lots to be grateful for, we can survive, we can struggle to be in the best place possible, we may triumph if we persist in those struggles, or learn a new way of proceeding. We may even have God on our side, but the problems are real, and have to be faced, even the unpleasant problems of ethical uncertainty.
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